Nobelist Robert Solow reviews John Cassidy's new book on "utopian economics" versus "real-world economics," sort of an overview of efficient markets theory and market failures for nonspecialists, with an application to the recent financial panic. A few weeks back, I wrote on Cassidy's piece in the New Yorker on the Chicago school, which I thought was a little too "light-versus-dark," to use some of Solow's terminology.
Solow points out on the last page of his review that some of the very interesting questions raised by recent events go unasked and unanswered. These include why it is that the "real-world" argument seems to have lost out to the "utopian" view even though it's almost by definition more true. "Are we for some reason more receptive to simple answers than to complex ones? Is it that, in the nature of the case, there is more money backing one side than the other? Perhaps the long postwar prosperity provided good growing conditions for conservative political and economic ideology." All interesting food for thought.
Friday, January 22, 2010
Feldstein assesses economic policies
It's hard not to agree uniformly with Martin Feldstein's views on Obama administration economic policies, but there's one thing I think he left out. An attractive element of the health insurance reform bill from an economist's perspective is or was the so-called excise tax on employer-paid plan contributions, a better description of which is a reduction or elimination of the tax preference for health insurance premia over wages. Unless we feel health insurance is under-utilized for those with employer-provider coverage, and I don't think we do, there's no reason to tilt the tax code toward premia and away from wages, as the current system is.
Feldstein also argues that permanent tax cuts are better than temporary tax cuts, and that incentives to replace aging equipment (investment goods) would have brought more bang for the buck. Even a lengthy temporary tax cut on capital goods would probably result in much stimulus. What is somewhat less clear is whether temporary tax cuts on wages or income have much impact on consumption spending.
Feldstein also argues that permanent tax cuts are better than temporary tax cuts, and that incentives to replace aging equipment (investment goods) would have brought more bang for the buck. Even a lengthy temporary tax cut on capital goods would probably result in much stimulus. What is somewhat less clear is whether temporary tax cuts on wages or income have much impact on consumption spending.
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
A bank tax as a retroactive insurance fee
Douglas Diamond and Anil Kashyap make a forceful case for a tax on banks to recoup TARP losses. They propose a tax that is proportional to the size of each bank's bailout, a retroactive fee for insurance that should have been assessed prior to the crisis. A notable difference is that the fee is based on ex post realizations of risk rather than ex ante assessments, like insurance usually is, so it reduces the implicit risk sharing across banks that FDIC insurance would impart, for example.
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
New economics of marriage
That's the title of a Pew Research Center report released today that examines trends in working, education, marriage, and household income across several decades. What they're referring to is the historic rise of women's education and earnings relative to men. Although there still are wage disparities between the sexes, within the age cohort aged 30-44, women now have more education than men.
This has created significant differences in trend income growth across groups according to marriage patterns. As you might expect, married couples have considerably higher household income than singles, and that gap has been widening over time. An article in the Times titled "More Men Marrying Wealthier Wives discusses all this from a popular-media perspective. The way the title gets it right is that there surely is some selection afoot: married couples today, when divorce is common, are probably a more select group than they were decades ago. One hypothesis that fits the data (and the anecdotes in the Times story) is that marriage has become relatively more common among couples who jointly have high education, and thus high earnings, and less among mismatched couples.
This has created significant differences in trend income growth across groups according to marriage patterns. As you might expect, married couples have considerably higher household income than singles, and that gap has been widening over time. An article in the Times titled "More Men Marrying Wealthier Wives discusses all this from a popular-media perspective. The way the title gets it right is that there surely is some selection afoot: married couples today, when divorce is common, are probably a more select group than they were decades ago. One hypothesis that fits the data (and the anecdotes in the Times story) is that marriage has become relatively more common among couples who jointly have high education, and thus high earnings, and less among mismatched couples.
Monday, January 18, 2010
New estimate of early human population size
An article by Huff et al. in the NY Times summarizes research published in the PNAS that examines human genetic history for information about early population size.
The authors' point estimate of the size of the human population 1.3 million years ago is 18,500, with a 95% confidence interval that stretches between 14,500 and 26,000. In fact, this roughly corresponds to the estimate of Harpending et al., published in 1998, of around 10,000. What's remarkable is the comparison in the Huff article of the relative sizes of various primate populations. According to this evidence, early humans were by no means more plentiful, i.e., evolutionarily successful.
The authors' point estimate of the size of the human population 1.3 million years ago is 18,500, with a 95% confidence interval that stretches between 14,500 and 26,000. In fact, this roughly corresponds to the estimate of Harpending et al., published in 1998, of around 10,000. What's remarkable is the comparison in the Huff article of the relative sizes of various primate populations. According to this evidence, early humans were by no means more plentiful, i.e., evolutionarily successful.
Thursday, January 14, 2010
Boskin takes out everyone
Michael Boskin spares nobody in a scathing review of statistical shenanigans. My first thought was that he'd take on the "jobs saved or created" numbers of the Obama administration again, and so he does. But not before taking on the French and the Venezuelans for suggesting fast and loose play with standards of national accounting. And the CBO's scoring of the health insurance reform bill gets honorable mention.
One could quibble with how phony statistics are not monopolized by either end of the political spectrum, but that is wholly beside the point. Boskin is absolutely right about how numbers that do lie --- namely those that are cooked up --- only end up reducing popular support for anything couched in quantitative terms.
One could quibble with how phony statistics are not monopolized by either end of the political spectrum, but that is wholly beside the point. Boskin is absolutely right about how numbers that do lie --- namely those that are cooked up --- only end up reducing popular support for anything couched in quantitative terms.
Monetary Policy and Bubbles
In the WSJ today, David Wessel criticizes the paper prepared by Ben Bernanke and the Fed staff that Bernanke delivered at the AEA earlier this month. The million dollar question everyone wants to know is whether a low federal funds rate stimulates excessive risk taking and bubble formation. Bernanke argues that empirically the answer seems to be, "not much," but Wessel argues (1) that common sense suggests such a role, and (2) that Raghuram Rajan's point about global savings seeking out high returns implicates a low fed funds rate.
Of the two, the second and less emphasized point is something that seems to be more of an open question. Bernanke's paper does a good job of sketching out the empirics of the link between fed funds rate and subprime lending, for example. The role of the global savings glut is something he raises as well in the paper, and Rajan's insight sounds relatively well-taken. When agents have absolutely no idea what the riskiness of securities is, or are seemingly misled by horribly incorrect ratings from Moody's and S&P, it's plausible that a low fed funds rate and low returns on risk-free government bonds would lead toward an asset bubble.
But if that is true, is it (a) the perceptions of or taste for risk, (b) the rating agencies, or (c) the fed funds rate that is responsible? It seems like if either of the first two issues had been fixed, the Fed would be off the hook.
Of the two, the second and less emphasized point is something that seems to be more of an open question. Bernanke's paper does a good job of sketching out the empirics of the link between fed funds rate and subprime lending, for example. The role of the global savings glut is something he raises as well in the paper, and Rajan's insight sounds relatively well-taken. When agents have absolutely no idea what the riskiness of securities is, or are seemingly misled by horribly incorrect ratings from Moody's and S&P, it's plausible that a low fed funds rate and low returns on risk-free government bonds would lead toward an asset bubble.
But if that is true, is it (a) the perceptions of or taste for risk, (b) the rating agencies, or (c) the fed funds rate that is responsible? It seems like if either of the first two issues had been fixed, the Fed would be off the hook.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)